EDT
RELEASE TO PUBLIC
A Working Document — 2026 Edition

ThiagoGoncalves.

Working at the intersection of AI platforms and cybersecurity — designing the infrastructure around models (memory, guardrails, auditability) so they hold up in production, under scrutiny, and against misuse.

Thiago Goncalves
PLATE I — Subject, Builder-Operator.2026/04
§ 01

Statement of Intent

Senior software engineer with 20+ years building and securing production systems. I work at the intersection of AI platforms, security, and developer tooling — designing the infrastructure around AI models (persistent memory, evaluation boundaries, guardrails, credential safety, auditability) so they hold up in production, under scrutiny, and against misuse. Founder-operator running the full vertical: bare-metal local inference on a self-hosted stack (Ollama on TrueNAS SCALE), Model Context Protocol middleware, IDE-resident extensions, marketing surface, payment integration, and the IP work underneath. Background in offensive security (CEH, TryHackMe rank #231 US) shapes how I design AI systems — adversarial conditions assumed, trust boundaries explicit, failure modes engineered for, not hoped against. Self-taught.

§ 02

Selected Highlights

  • H-01
    96.4%
    token reduction at n = 2,189

    Continuity's bounded-retrieval middleware enforces a hard ceiling on per-turn decision injection (default top-K = 3, hard cap = 10, per-record character caps). Worst-case per-turn cost ≈17,500 tokens regardless of corpus size — against a static-embedding baseline that would require ~485,000 tokens at the same decision count. Local Sentence-BERT embeddings (Xenova/all-MiniLM-L6-v2 on ONNX Runtime), sub-15ms retrieval, zero telemetry.

  • H-02
    Oct 2025
    shipped before the platforms

    Published Continuity to the VS Code Marketplace in October 2025. Anthropic shipped a near-identical Session Memory architecture for Claude Code months later — independent validation of the design.

  • H-03
    5 layers
    defense-in-depth credential safety

    Designed and shipped a five-boundary credential-scrubbing architecture for memory-augmented AI assistants: redaction at the MCP input boundary, at the AI-generated output boundary, at the persistence write sink, again at the persistence read path, and at the MCP tool-result return. 27 provider-specific patterns plus a Shannon-entropy fallback empirically calibrated to 4.5 bits per character. Measured 100% recall on the positive corpus; 0% high-confidence false positives on ~1,200-string negative corpus. Idempotent scrub primitive verified across all 27 patterns in a 56-test suite.

  • H-04
    RedArchives
    tamper-evident archive

    Evidence preservation for human rights documentation. Cryptographic fingerprinting, blockchain-anchored provenance, explicit threat model covering insider risk, post-hoc tampering, chain-of-custody disputes, and decade-scale temporal attacks.

  • H-05
    $85K+ / yr
    savings at ShineOn

    Through SaaS rationalization and vendor consolidation. Identified and remediated silent security drift without service disruption.

§ 03

Professional Record

R-01
Sep 2022
Present
Remote
Founder-Operator

Founder & Technical Lead

Hackerware LLC

Security-focused applied AI lab. Builder-operator across architecture, implementation, deployment, and iteration — bare metal to paid Pro tier on the VS Code Marketplace.

// Project — R-01.01

Continuity — Persistent memory and runtime governance for AI-assisted development.

  • 01Identified the core failure mode: AI assistants produce inconsistent output because architectural decisions, constraints, and rationale are lost between sessions. Treated context as infrastructure, not convenience.
  • 02Designed a bounded-retrieval middleware that decouples per-turn token consumption from total stored knowledge. Hard-ceilinged top-K (default 3, max 10) with per-record character caps. At n = 2,189 decisions, worst-case per-turn injection is ≈17,500 tokens against a static-embedding baseline of ~485,000 — a ~96.4% reduction that holds as the corpus grows.
  • 03Shipped a five-layer defense-in-depth credential-scrubbing architecture for the Memory Amplifier threat — credentials that enter AI context once and get re-injected into every future session through persisted memory. Five enforcement boundaries (input, AI output, persistence write, persistence read, tool result) consuming a shared idempotent scrub primitive. 27 provider-specific patterns plus a Shannon-entropy fallback calibrated to 4.5 bits/char (measured 100% recall, 0% high-confidence FP).
  • 04Built the MCP security interception layer that validates and gates tool execution before LLM-initiated actions reach the file system or external services — enforcement boundary, not policy document. Intercept → Pause → Evaluate → Enforce pipeline operating under a Compromised Context threat model.
  • 05Designed human-in-the-loop correction model: corrections stored as scoped annotations with timestamps, not global overrides. Prevents contamination of unrelated future outputs and resolves conflicts deterministically (narrower scope wins within applicability window).
  • 06Drafted the full patent portfolio — Patent 1 (bounded retrieval + Governance Lock), Patent 1 CIP (multi-signal relationship enforcement with Markov decision-chain prediction), Patent 2 provisional (defense-in-depth credential scrubbing) — including §101 Alice arguments, §112 enablement, and OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) controls mapping across nine categories.
  • 07Security-first defaults: 100% local storage, zero telemetry, on-device vector index. Develops against a self-hosted inference stack (Ollama on TrueNAS SCALE) using the same MCP protocol it ships to users on Anthropic, Gemini, or OpenAI — backend is swappable, application code is identical. Shipped to VS Code Marketplace October 2025; active paid users in production.
Stack //TypeScript · Node.js · MCP · SQLite · Sentence-BERT (Xenova/all-MiniLM-L6-v2 on ONNX Runtime) · Markov decision-chain · keytar (OS keychain) · multi-LLM (Anthropic / Gemini / Ollama) · VS Code Extension API · CLI
// Project — R-01.02

RedArchives — Tamper-evident digital evidence platform.

  • 01Designed for environments where evidence must survive adversarial challenge, insider threats, and legal scrutiny over decades. Mission: preserve documentation of war crimes and human rights violations with cryptographic integrity that doesn't depend on trusting the platform operator.
  • 02Built layered integrity architecture (Artifact Ingestion → Provenance Ledger → Metadata Store → Verification Layer → Presentation Layer) with explicit separation of duties between storage, verification, and presentation.
  • 03Implemented blockchain-anchored cryptographic fingerprinting at ingestion; fingerprints cover normalized metadata, not just content, preventing semantic rewriting without detection. Designed for algorithm agility and re-verification paths to address long-term cryptographic decay.
  • 04Modeled explicit adversarial threats: post-hoc tampering, chain-of-custody disputes, insider risk, temporal attacks, selective disclosure, platform trust collapse. Same integrity discipline informs how I design trust-critical AI systems (training data provenance, evaluation artifacts, feedback integrity).
Stack //Next.js · TypeScript · IPFS / libp2p (Helia) · Hyperledger Fabric · Anthropic Claude · Google Vision · Prisma · AWS S3 · FFmpeg · Kubernetes
R-02
May 2022
Feb 2026
St Petersburg, FL
Full-time

Senior IT & Security Systems Specialist

ShineOn

Owner-on-call for production systems in a fast-scaling e-commerce environment.

  • 01Delivered $85K+ annual savings through SaaS rationalization, vendor consolidation, and lifecycle management. Consolidated access control, cameras, and network into a unified Ubiquiti environment, reducing attack surface.
  • 02Identified and remediated silent security drift — configuration changes that weakened controls without triggering alerts. Restored posture without service disruption and introduced verification checks to detect future drift.
  • 03Led incident response and root-cause analysis across endpoints, identity, and network telemetry; investigated suspicious activity using Microsoft Defender and system logs; produced runbooks, post-mortems, and audit-ready evidence.
  • 04Administered and hardened Windows/Linux endpoints, virtualization, identity, and network infrastructure. Spearheaded company-wide Jira adoption; primary escalation for critical incidents; maintained 99.9% availability.
R-03
Nov 2021
Present
Remote
Independent

Penetration Tester (Independent)

Quantum IT
  • 01Full-scope penetration tests across networks, web applications, cloud infrastructure, and endpoints for SMB/enterprise clients. Tooling: Burp Suite, Nessus, Nmap, Metasploit, SQLMap, Kali Linux, custom scripts.
  • 02Identified OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities and high-risk findings (SQLi, XSS, auth bypass, broken authorization, API flaws, lateral movement, privilege escalation). Delivered executive risk reports with CVSS scoring, remediation guidance, and compliance alignment (NIST, ISO, HIPAA).
R-04
2003
Present
Remote
Independent

IT Specialist

Independent Practice

Foundation for the operational instincts that shape my current security and AI platform work.

  • 01Windows/Linux server administration, Active Directory, Group Policy, virtualization, hybrid cloud (AWS/Azure).
  • 02Network architecture (VLANs, firewalls, VPNs), system hardening, patch management.
  • 03Mentorship of junior staff.
§ 04

Core Competencies

  • C-01

    AI Platform & Security

    persistent context and bounded retrievalsemantic retrieval (Sentence-BERT embeddings, ONNX Runtime, cosine similarity)Markov-chain modeling over decision-tag sequencesMCP tool interception and runtime governancedefense-in-depth credential safety (5-layer scrubbing pipeline)Memory Amplifier threat model for memory-augmented AIOWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) controls mappingself-hosted inference (Ollama on TrueNAS SCALE)multi-LLM orchestration (Anthropic, Gemini, OpenAI, local)human-in-the-loop correction without RLHF-style contaminationprompt injection / jailbreak / unsafe tool-use testing

  • C-02

    Security Engineering

    threat modeling (Compromised Context, Memory Amplifier, adversarial input)offensive security (web/API/cloud, OWASP Top 10, MITRE ATT&CK)incident response & DFIREDR/SIEM (Microsoft Defender)identity (Entra ID / Azure AD)tamper-evident system designprovenance, auditability, chain-of-custodycryptographic fingerprinting and blockchain-anchored integrity

  • C-03

    Software & Infrastructure

    TypeScript, Node.js, PythonNext.js 15 (App Router), Radix UI, Tailwind, ShadCNVS Code extension architecture, MCP middleware, language serversFlutter / Dart (cross-platform mobile), BLE protocols, AR wearable SDKsPrisma, PostgreSQL, Redis, SQLiteIPFS / libp2p, Hyperledger FabricAWS, Azure, DigitalOcean, Cloudflare, Docker, Kubernetes, CI/CDLinux & Windows administration, virtualization, network segmentationTrueNAS SCALE, self-hosted infrastructure

  • C-04

    Communication & Ownership

    architecture decision records (dogfooded — Continuity logs its own)patent specification drafting (claim language, §101 Alice analysis, §112 enablement)technical writing (security threat models, white papers)runbooks, post-mortems, executive-ready risk reportingfounder-level scoping, vendor management, end-to-end delivery

§ 05

Credentials Index

  • CR-01
    Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH)
    EC-Council
  • CR-02
    Microsoft Cybersecurity Analyst Specialization
    Entra ID · Defender · threat vectors · SC-900 prep
  • CR-03
    ISC2 Cybersecurity Specialization
    2024
  • CR-04
    TryHackMe Leaderboard
    Rank #231 United States · top 2,000 worldwide
  • CR-05
    Captain — Children of Exu
    Huntress CTF · 2023
  • CR-06
    Patent Portfolio (in preparation)
    USPTO · 3 applications: bounded retrieval, relationship enforcement (CIP), defense-in-depth credential scrubbing (provisional)
Verified Credentials // Credly
C-001
C-002
C-003
C-004
C-005
C-006
C-007
C-008
C-009
C-010
C-011
C-012
C-013
C-014
C-015
C-016
C-017
C-018